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1. -INTRODUCTION
The United States has a strong interest in protecting its securities
markets.' By maintaining strict prohibitions against fraudulent activity
2
such as insider trading,' the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has succeeded in creating a securities market where investor
protection is kept at a premium. When these prohibitions are enforced
abroad, however, they may be perceived as threats to sovereignty
interests.
4
To protect their national interests, countries such as the United
Kingdom have enacted "blocking statutes" which effectively limit the
flow of information to foreign entities, including the SEC.5 These
blocking statutes have the dual effect of frustrating the SEC's enforce-
ment of its regulations abroad and of providing undue protection for
those persons committing fraud on United States markets. By their very
* J.D. candidate, 1988, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1984,
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1 For a summary of arguments for and against the protection of United States
securities markets from fraudulent activity, see Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
2 In this context, fraudulent conduct refers to "intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by . . . artificially affecting the price of securi-
ties." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). See also, L. Loss, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 799-818 (1983) (author giving comparative
description of fraud under federal regulations).
' By definition, "[i]nsider trading usually involves the sale or purchase of com-
pany shares or securities by persons connected with a company (insiders), who have
price-sensitive information not generally known by the public or by the persons with
whom the insiders deal." Herne, Inside Information: Definition in Australia, Ca-
nada, the U.K., and the U.S., 8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MKT. L. 1, 1 (1986).
" In this context, sovereignty interests refer to the power of a nation to prescribe
laws regulating activities within its territory. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. Mc-
Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (Chief Justice Marshall noting that "[t]he
jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and abso-
lute."); see infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 64-112 and accompanying text.
(549)
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nature, these blocking statutes represent a serious impediment to valid
SEC actions.' While resembling overbroad assertions of protectionism
designed solely to frustrate the policing efforts of other nations, block-
ing statutes embody important national sovereignty interests arising
from circumstances wholly apart from securities market regulation.
Therefore, an understanding of the various interests at issue requires
an analysis of both the context in which blocking statutes arise and the
interests of the SEC in extraterritorial enforcement of its securities
laws.
This Comment argues that an accommodation of the SEC's and
the foreign nation's interests requires the joint effort of the parties to
reach a compromise of the interests at stake. While bilateral agreements
have assisted the SEC's efforts in countries which maintain bank se-
crecy laws, the need for negotiations becomes even more acute when
blocking statutes are present. In this latter context, this Comment fo-
cuses on the blocking statutes enacted by the United Kingdom and sug-
gests (a) that unilateral efforts by the SEC in enforcing its regulations
abroad will be counterproductive, and (b) that a proper balancing of
competing national interests is better left to the executive political pro-
cess than to the courts. While the recently negotiated Memorandum of
Understanding between the SEC and the United Kingdom's Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry (DTI) represents the beginnings of such a
cooperative effort, the protection which it offers to valuable national
interests is drastically insufficient7 Therefore, as a proposal for future
negotiations, this Comment argues that a procedural framework
modeled on a recently negotiated antitrust treaty may provide a realistic
means of balancing the interests of the SEC and the United Kingdom.
2. CONFLICT OF NATIONAL INTEREST BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
2.1. Interests of the United States in Policing International Securi-
ties Fraud and the Potential for Conflict with Other Nations
The authority for the policing of international securities fraud by
6 See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 220-48 and accompanying text. Memorandum of Understanding
on Exchange of Information Between the United States Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in Matters Relat-
ing to Securities and Between the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in Matters Relating
to Futures, Sept. 23, 1986 (available from SEC, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Mem-
orandum of Understanding].
[Vol. 9:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss3/13
SEC AND FOREIGN BLOCKING STATUTES
the SEC is found in the Securities Act of 19338 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.9 Under the 1933 Act, investors in securities
must receive from the issuer material information about a security of-
fered for public sale."0 The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 fur-
ther protects investors beyond the public offering stage by restricting
certain types of fraudulent transactions after the securities are issued
and outstanding.1 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits any person
from using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the commission may pre-
scribe as necessary." 2 Adding substance to this provision, Rule 10b-5,
promulgated under the authority of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
makes the following unlawful while trading in securities:
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any per-
son, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."3
As interpreted, Rule 10b-5 creates a broad prohibition against the trad-
ing of securities by corporate insiders based on material non-ptiblic in-
formation belonging to the corporation of which the insiders are a
part. 4 The SEC is granted the authority to make investigations of any
suspected violations in its enforcement of Rule 10b-5."
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g-77k, 77aa (1982).
', 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
12 Id.
13 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
14 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-49 (2d Cir. 1968).
1" 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982). Note, however, that under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the powers of the SEC in investigating securities fraud are not unlimited.
As a general rule, unless a formal order of investigation has been issued, the SEC
cannot properly proceed, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b), 78u (1982); Moessle, The Basic Struc-
ture of United States Securities Law Enforcement in International Cases, 16 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (1986). See generally, Recent Developments, Securities Regulations
Investigations - United States-Swiss Treaty Attempts to Increase Cooperation in Re-
leasing Names of Swiss-Based Account Holders Involved in United States Securities
and Exchange Commission Investigations, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 137
(1985) (discussing insider trading provisions as applied both domestically and interna-
tionally). For a general discussion of investigatory powers of the United States agencies,
1987]
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Extending these prohibitions beyond the domestic setting has been
fairly difficult for the SEC. 6 While there is a general lack of legislative
guidance for the extension of the antifraud provisions beyond United
States borders,'17 the federal courts generally have only applied United
States securities laws extraterritorially in those instances where there
has been either some conduct within the United States' s or a significant
impact on the United States securities market" by a foreign entity.20 In
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,2' the court held that the antifraud provi-
sions of Rule 10b-5 apply both to losses of United States citizens caused
see infra note 248 and accompanying text.
16 See Loomis & Grant, The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Finan-
cial Institutions Outside the U.S. and Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities
Laws, I J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 3, 7 (1978).
17 Id.
" This notion of "conduct-based" jurisdiction has been widely used by the SEC
in securities regulations. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Conti-
nental Grain, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir.
1975); see also Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 8; Moessle, supra note 15, at 10-
12. A similar determination is also made under the Restatement (Second), where a
determination is made of "whether there was sufficient conduct in the United States
and/or whether transactions performed entirely outside the United States nevertheless
had a direct, foreseeable, and substantial impact on United States investors and securi-
ties markets." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 17-18
(1965); Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 7; Moessle, supra note 15, at 10-12.
19 This assertion of "effects-based" jurisdiction was recognized by the court in
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), as a separate basis
of jurisdiction apart from "conduct-based" jurisdiction. Hermann, Extraterritorial
Criminal Jurisdiction in Securities Law Regulation, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 207, 216-17
(1986). See generally Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 11-13 (noting that "it ap-
pears clear that, in order for there to be jurisdiction over foreign acts constituting a
substantive violation of the United States securities laws, those acts must in and of
themselves result in substantial damage to an interest protected by the United States
securities laws."). While several commentators have noted that, in the area of securities
law, effects-based jurisdiction was first established in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) as an attempt to protect United States investors from foreign
acts (see Hermann, supra, at 214-15; Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 19), the
doctrine seems to have been first created in the area of antitrust laws in United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), where Judge Learned Hand
stated "it is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily
recognize." Id. at 443. As a limit to overly broad assertions of jurisdiction, Judge Hand
noted that "[w]e should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts
can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States." Id. Other
commentators have agreed that a further limitation to "effects-based" jurisdiction
should be created where the offense is not recognized as such by foreign nations. Rosen,
The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 15 INT'L LAW. 213, 216 (1981).
20 Hermann, supra note 19, at 213; Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 6-7;
Thomas, Extraterritorial Application of the United States Securities Laws: The Need
for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. CORP. L. 189, 192 (1982).
21 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
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by fraudulent acts abroad and acts within the United States conducted
by United States citizens residing abroad.22 A former SEC commis-
sioner has noted that one justification for applying United States securi-
ties law extraterritorially is to uphold the strong interest of the United
States in protecting its investors.23 A related, but different, rationale is
to prevent the United States securities market from being used as a
forum for securities fraud.24
While the interests of the United States in protecting its investors
and preserving the integrity of its securities markets are undoubtedly
valid,25 the strength of these interests weakens when they are asserted
outside its borders. At first glance, it might appear that the problem
created by the extraterritorial application of the United States securities
laws is simply due to an inevitable conflict between very different sys-
tems of securities regulation;2 6 on closer inspection, it is apparent that
foreign countries may well perceive attempts by the United States to
apply its securities laws abroad as either an interference with national
sovereignty,27 a lack of deference by United States courts to principles
of comity and procedural fair hearing,28 a disrespect for internationally
recognized principles restricting the extraterritorial reach of a nation's
laws,29 or an offense to public policy unworthy of recognition.30 Ac-
22 Id. at 987-93.
23 Thomas, supra note 20, at 190.
24 Id.
2 See generally Loomis & Grant, supra note 163, at 3 (authors noting that "[t]he
Commission also has a legitimate concern, in this time of rapid and sophisticated inter-
national communications, to prevent anyone from using foreign instrumentalities to
evade United States securities laws").
26 One commentator has gone so far as to state that "[f]or most non-U.S. persons,
in particular for Europeans, the U.S. securities laws constitute an incomprehensible
bulk of infinitely complicated rules which are totally strange to them. Many look at
them simply as one of the bases for that great U.S. pastime of suing one another."
Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws - Banking Law of the World? (A Reply to Messrs.
Loomis and Grant), 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 39, 39 (1978).
27 See Thomas, supra note 20, at 193 (former SEC Commissioner noting that "[a]
foreign country might well view application of U.S. law to a securities transaction that
takes place within the foreign country's borders and that involves non-U.S. citizens as
interference with the foreign country's regulatory practices, economic philosophy or na-
tional policies").
28 See Liftin, Our Playing Field, Our Rules: An Analysis of the SEC's Waiver by
Conduct Approach, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 525, 528 (1985) ("Under general prin-
ciples of comity, recognition and enforcement of judicial decrees rendered by the courts
of another sovereign nation are premised on observance by the rendering forum of the
essentials of judicial jurisdiction and of a fair hearing").
29 Moessle, supra note 15, at 20 (author quoting the S.S. "Lotus" Case (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18-19 (Judgment of Sept. 7)) (suggesting that
foreign nations often restrict foreign laws on the basis of their territoriality):
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon
a State is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule - it may not
19871
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cordingly, the extraterritorial assertion of securities laws by the United
States may potentially create bitter and unnecessary conflicts with for-
eign regulators, 1 as well as a reduction in the free flow of capital in
world commerce. 2
2.2. Interests of the United Kingdom and the Development of Block-
ing Statutes
2.2.1. Extraterritorial Use of United States Law Leading Up to the
Creation of Blocking Statutes
Application of federal regulatory law to cover acts occurring in
foreign nations is largely premised on the effect of such acts on United
States commerce. 3 This "effects" doctrine, which requires an effect on
United States commerce as a jurisdictional threshold, 4 was broadly ex-
panded in scope by the United States courts. 5 By judging a foreign
action solely on the consequences that the action may have on domestic
commerce, however, the effects doctrine gives undue emphasis to do-
mestic concerns, while it entirely ignores any counterbalancing foreign
interests.36
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this
sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from in-
ternational custom or from a convention.
30 See id. at 20.
3 Williams & Spencer, Regulation of International Securities Markets: Towards
A Greater Cooperation, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 55, 59 (1982).
32 Thomas, supra note 20, at 190.
'3 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
"' Kestenbaum, Antitrust's "Extraterritorial" Jurisdiction: A Progress Report
on the Balancing of Interests Tests, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 311, 333 (1982). For discus-
sion of "effects-based" jurisdiction, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
3' Id. at 312. One author has noted that the original "effects" doctrine was in-
tended only to cover those acts affecting United States commerce which were shown to
possess an "intent" to affect commerce. Id. at 416. In Learned Hand's holding in Al-
coa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), however, this limitation is not readily apparent.
Looking to the possibility that Congress intended to regulate acts which had only an
effect on United States commerce, the court only went so far as to note that, "[w]hen
one considers the international complications likely to arise from an effort in this coun-
try to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress certainly
did not intend the Act to cover them." United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d at 443. However, the court never explicitly stated that once an effect on United
States commerce was found, proof of existence of such intent was a prerequisite to
maintaining jurisdiction.
38 This lack of deference given by the effects doctrine created under the Alcoa
decision has been particularly troublesome for the British. Beyond the obvious problems
of enforcement jurisdiction, whereby a state cannot coercively force acts within the ju-
risdiction of a foreign state without some form of permission from that state (Moessle,
supra note 15, at 16 n.88), there is a general feeling that the United Kingdom consid-
ers the effects doctrine as "pay[ing] comparatively little attention to the interests of
[Vol. 9:3
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In the area of antitrust, affronts to interests of the United King-
dom through the assertion of effects-based jurisdiction have been widely
recognized." In large part, the animosities that arise from such inter-
national conflicts are attributable to a difference in national policies
towards collective commercial enterprises. 38 This difference in orienta-
tions is particularly evident in the divergent approaches to international
shipping. 9 As noted in the parliamentary debates prior to the passage
of the Protection of Trading Interests Act, an essential distinction be-
tween United States and British shipping policies derived from the fact
that collective shipping activities were usually not illegal in the United
Kingdom. 40 The resulting unilateral attack on the shipping interests of
foreign states." 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 556 (1980) (debates prior to
passage to the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980). As one author has noted,
"Great Britain has stood virtually alone in maintaining that extraterritorial jurisdiction
based on economic effects is contrary to the law of nations." Cira, The Challenge of
Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 248
(1982).
37 In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.
1980), the court favored American interests in finding that an alleged cartel of interna-
tional uranium suppliers had illicitly engaged in acts prohibited under the antitrust
laws, despite strong arguments made by the British government on amicus curiae brief:
The application of the effects doctrine is regarded by Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment as being particularly objectionable in the field of antitrust
legislation:
(1) The formation of a cartel and other activities against which
anti-trust legislation is directed are not universally recognized as
unlawful ....
(2) The assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in anti-trust matters
represents an extension of the economic policy of one state which is
likely to conflict with that of other states.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Corp., quoted in Rosen,
supra note 19, at 222. For a detailed account of this case, see Cira, supra note 36, at
250; Kohlmeier, The Uranium Affair, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 149 (1978).
Apart from the uranium cartel cases, similar conflicts of American antitrust con-
cerns and British commerce interests have occurred in the several shipping cases. See
generally Cira, supra note 36, at 251; Rosen, supra note 19, at 223-24 (both Cira and
Rosen giving fairly thorough accounts of shipping antitrust cases leading up to the
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980). Less prominent instances of conflicts of
United States and British interests in the antitrust setting are numerous. See also Si-
mon & Waller, Analyzing Claims of Sovereignty in International Economic Disputes,
7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 1-2 (1985).
8 See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Westinghouse, supra note 37; Beckett, Symposium of
Transnational Litigation II, United Kingdom, 18 INT'L LAW. 773 (1984); Novicoff,
Blocking And Clawing Back in the Name of Public Policy: The United Kingdom's
Protection of Private Economic Interests Against Adverse Foreign Adjudications, 7
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 12, 28 (1985).
31 See 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 581-83 (1980) (remarks of Earl of
Inchcape).
40 Id. at 581.
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the United Kingdom by the United States through the enforcement of
its antitrust legislation had been felt heavily by the United Kingdom."'
Both the importance in British commerce and the intrinsically interna-
tional character of British shipping has increased British sensitivity to
this attack.42 The affront to British national interests is further high-
lighted by feelings that the United States, in attempting to exercise ju-
risdiction over its international antitrust cases, pays "comparatively lit-
tle attention to the interests and policies of foreign Governments where
[those interests] have been in conflict with those of the United States." '43
In terms of the actual harm caused to British trading interests by the
extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws, the potential
award of treble damages provided for in these laws may cause British
corporate defendants significant economic hardship.44 As perceived by
several British commentators, treble damage awards clearly go beyond
compensation 5 for the actual damages suffered by the United States
plaintiff; instead, they are understood as being purely punitive in na-
ture,46 and clearly constituting double jeopardy.47 Not surprisingly, in
light of the perceived damage to British sovereignty caused by the puni-
tive damage awards provided for in United States antitrust legislation,
arguments calling for a strong assertion of British national interests
have been advanced.48
Apart from the substantive differences between United States and
41 See, e.g., id. at 481-83.
42 Id. at 581.
43 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1535 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John
Nott, Secretary of State for Trade). Critics of United States exportation of economic
policy, however, have noted United States court deference to foreign interests. See, e.g.,
976 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1024, 1047 (remarks of Mr. Jeffrey Thomas concern-
ing Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) and Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979)).
41 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15 (1982).
4' See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1536 (1979) (Mr. John Nott noting
the unfair burdens placed upon British defendants by certain aspects of litigation
unique to the United States, such as the class action suit and the contingency fee
agreement).
46 Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran has stated in debate that "[o]ur companies do not
mind paying damages, but punitive damages go against our general legal system, and I
am sure that a modification of this attitude in your country would do a great deal to
help us." Debate: Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law (Economic Impe-
rialism or Protecting Competition Against Foreign Invasion?), 50 ANTITRUST L.J.
617, 633 (1981).
47 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 557 (1980) (L. MacKay commenting,
"[the] possibility of concurrent criminal and civil penal proceedings introduces a clear
element of double jeopardy").
48 See, e.g., 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 926, 932-35 (1980) (L. Hacking
noting that, in passage of the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, the United
Kingdom should be strong in asserting national policy).
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British legal theories, differences in what is perceived to be proper judi-
cial procedure have also led to dissension between the two nations.
While English courts have occasionally given undue deference to the
interests of the United Kingdom over those of other nations,49 the ex-
tent to which the United States courts have convoluted United States
antitrust principles50 and exported them abroad,51 has led a member of
Parliament, during the debates prior to the enactment of the Protection
of Trading Interest Act, to note:
[a]ll courts have, latent within them, a deep imperialism.
They all wish to extend their jurisdiction. No court is more
inclined to do that than one suffused with an ideology that is
almost equivalent to a religion. Anyone who has talked to
American competition lawyers, whether on the Bench or at
the Bar, will know that the Sherman and Clayton Acts in
the United States are the equivalent of holy books.52
One area of particular trouble is the scope of discovery ordered by
the United States courts.53 Under domestic rules of procedure, the scope
of discovery requests can be very broad. In federal court, for example, a
party is entitled to pretrial discovery of any nonprivileged information
as long as it is "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action" and "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
* As Sir John Donaldson M.R. has stated on one occasion:
Relations between the United Kingdom and foreign states are not the sub-
ject of direct Parliamentary action, but are a matter for her Majesty acting
on the advice of her Government. The foreign policy which is adopted is
referred to as that of the United Kingdom Government, but this is mis-
leading since in reality it is that of the nation. Accordingly, it would be
strange if in this field courts and the executive spoke with different voices
and they should not do so.
British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., 1984 Q.B. 142, 193 (C.A. 1983) (emphasis
added).
50 One British commentator has noted that "[wihat we cannot quite comprehend
is how the United States courts have managed to turn [an easily comprehensible body
of antitrust laws] into such an instrument of torture. We are not used to trusting to our
courts such extensive powers." Beckett, supra note 38, at 774. See also, 973 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1551 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Graham Page noting that the
principle reaction embodied in the Protection of Trading Interests Act is to the "way
...American courts have developed the American anti-trust law").
51 See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1572 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Ivan
Lawrence noting that the American courts have used their antitrust laws to "clobber
the closest friend and ally that they have. It is a cruel stroke").
52 Id. at 1566 (remarks of Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke).
See, e.g., Atwood, Blocking Statutes and Sovereign Compulsion in American
Antitrust Litigation, 27 Swiss REv. INT'L COMPETITION L. 5, 9-11 (1986); Beckett,
supra note 38, at 778.
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admissible evidence." '5 4 Such broad standards give the courts substantial
freedom to order discovery from parties, which latitude has, in turn,
subjected courts to accusations of undertaking fishing expeditions. 5
Given the breadth of pretrial discovery in the United States, it
should come as no surprise that a similar vigor also carries over to the
international setting.56 The broad scope of international discovery at-
tempted by United States litigants, derogatorily termed by one British
author as "fishing discovery"5 7 or as a "knee-jerk reaction,"5 8 had led
to hostile reactions prior to the passage of the Protection of Trading
Interests Act.59 It is important, therefore, to bear in mind that many of
the negative reactions to discovery requests issued by United States
courts relate not to the contents of the documents which are sought, but
rather to the means used to obtain them.60
Aside from British reactions to the differences in law and judicial
procedure between the United States and Great Britain, another area of
concern relates to the nature of the party bringing suit. A private party
is entitled to bring a civil action for treble damages against a defendant
5" FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
As the Supreme Court stated:
No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to pre-
clude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the
other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-
discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can
be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reduc-
ing the possibility of surprise.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (footnotes omitted).
" An illustration of the reluctance of the United States to limit pretrial discovery
between nations is provided by the signing of the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 231 reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1985). Under the Con-
vention, each signatory country is permitted not to cooperate in pretrial discovery of
documents; all representative signatories, except the United States, opted to prohibit
pretrial discovery under the Convention. Atwood, supra note 53, at 9.
57 Beckett, supra note 38, at 778.
58 Id.
" Nelson, Insider Trading Originating Abroad and "Waiver by Conduct", 19
IN'r'L LAW. 817, 830, n. 68 (1985). See also, 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 907,
910-13 (1980) (remarks of L. Hacking noting that the scope of clause 2(3)(b) of the
Protection of Trading Interests Act should be broadened to protect against pretrial dis-
covery in the United States).
60 See generally, Newcomb, Policing Trans-Border Fraud: The View From the
Bridge, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 559, 574 (1985) (describing reactions to acts taken
by United States courts and concluding that, "most often the foreign reaction to unilat-
eral efforts by the United States to obtain information is a reaction not to the content of
the information sought, but rather to the heavy-handed methods employed").
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corporation under the antitrust laws of the United States."' Apart from
the potential threat of punitive sanctions, a separate concern is that pri-
vate plaintiffs might be unable to exercise either the deference to for-
eign interests or the degree of self-restraint necessary in cases where
national interests collide.6 2 Therefore, the resulting fear of civil anti-
trust actions reaches beyond a concern with the private character of the
plaintiff. Unfortunately, this fear may spread to civil actions generally,
including those brought by United States federal agencies.6"
2.2.2. The Protection of Trading Interests Act and the Assertion of
National Interests
In reaction to the extraterritorial expansion of United States anti-
trust laws, many countries have enacted 'blocking" statutes. 4 Under
these forms of retaliatory legislation, judgments of foreign nations
against a country's residents or foreign requests for discovery may be
"blocked" and rendered ineffective in the jurisdiction in which such
remedy or discovery is being sought.6 5 Often, such blockage of judg-
ments or information is within the discretion of a government official. 66
61 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
62 A similar point is developed in Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), where the court noted, as a second prong of a three-part
balancing test, that "a greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to
demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the
plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws" (emphasis added). Id. at
613. See also, 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 557 (1980) (remarks of L. Mac-
Kay noting concern that civil actions in the United States are not "subject to any of the
limitations we would regard as appropriate to criminal proceedings").
6" This strong ancillary concern with United States governmental agencies bring-
ing civil actions was developed most strongly during the debates prior to the passage of
the Protection of Trading Interests Act. 973 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1533, 1534,
1538, 1541 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John Nott, Secretary of State); 404 PARL. DEB.,
H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 559 (1980) (remarks of L. Mackay). The principle concern felt
was that United States governmental agencies asserted their powers too broadly in im-
posing penal sanctions under the guise of "civil" actions. Id.
6" One estimate of the number of retaliatory blocking statutes created in other
countries held that 26 countries have blocking statutes that either require refusal of
compliance with foreign informational requests or disallow recognition of foreign judg-
ments. Hurd, Insider Trading and Foreign Bank Secrecy, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 25, 47
n.185 (1986).
" Blocking statutes can be categorized into "discovery blocking statutes" (where
compliance with discovery requests of foreign courts, agencies, or private parties is
blocked) and "judgment blocking statutes" (where judgments rendered by foreign courts
or agencies are not recognized in the state enacting such legislation, if certain precondi-
tions stated in the statute exist). Fedders, Wade, Mann, Matthew, Bizer, Waiver by
Conduct -A Possible Response to the Internationalization of the Securities Markets,
6 J. INT'L COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MKT. L. 6, 35-37 (1984).
66 For instance, under the Protection of Trading Interests Act,
If it appears to the Secretary of State -
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In addition to being retaliatory in form, blocking statutes are also a
reaction to the scope of the extraterritorial assertion of United States
laws. For instance, two blocking statutes were enacted in Great Britain
in reaction to surges in United States antitrust litigation:"7 the Shipping
Contracts and Commercial Documents Act68 in 1964 and the Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Act69 in 1980.
The Protection of Trading Interests Act was, in effect, a revision
of its predecessor, the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents
Act. The earlier blocking statute was passed to protect several shippers
in Great Britain against United States antitrust actions." ° At the time
of its passage, the policy of the United Kingdom, as well as that of the
European Economic Community in general, was that "the best way of
achieving efficient and effective shipping services and [of] protecting the
interests of the consumer" was through deregulation of collective com-
mercial activities. 1 The Shipping Contracts and Commercial Docu-
ments Act was aimed at ensuring that this vital policy would not be
abused by actions from within the United States. 2 The 1964 Act, how-
ever, was intended to be limited to the shipping industry. 3 After the
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd. case7 4 the 1964 Act was
found to be too limited in application to address the concerns raised by
the second thrust of United States antitrust laws. 5 Accordingly, the
(a) that measures have been or are proposed to be taken by or under the
law of any overseas country for regulating or controlling international
trade; and
(b) that those measures, in so far as they apply or would apply to things
done outside the territorial jurisdiction of that country by persons carrying
on business in the United Kingdom, are damaging or threaten to damage
the trading interests of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State may by
order direct that this section shall apply to those measures either generally
or in their application to such cases as may be specified in the order.
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 1 (emphasis added). As a general
matter, blocking statutes can be classified by whether their blocking effect is discretion-
ary on the part of some government official or automatic upon the satisfaction of certain
threshold events. Moessle, supra note 15, at 22.
67 See generally Newcomb, supra note 60, at 570-71 (brief description of waves of
blocking statutes in reaction to United States litigation).
6 Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87, repealed by
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 8(5).
e Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.
70 973 PAR!.. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1538-39 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John
Nott).
71 Id.
72 See id. at 1544 (Mr. John Nott noting that the 1964 Act was "passed in re-
sponse to a specific and offensive instance of extra-territorial claim to jurisdiction by the
United States in shipping matters").
73 Id.; see also supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
74 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
71 973 PARi.. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1539-40, 1544 (1979) (remarks of Mr.
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need for more protective legislation was a key motivation for the adop-
tion of the Protection of Trading Interests Act in 1980.
As drafted, the Act was intended to focus on the protection of the
trading interests of the United Kingdom.76 As originally introduced in
the House of Commons by the British Secretary of State,
[the] objective in introducing this Bill [was] to reassert and
reinforce the defenses of the United Kingdom against at-
tempts by other countries to enforce their economic and com-
mercial policies unilaterally on [the United Kingdom] ....
[Tihe most objectionable method by which this [wals done
[wa]s by the extra-territorial application of domestic law.7
Therefore, the Act goes further than merely protecting British interests;
it also buttresses them against distortions of comity and sovereignty.7
Section 2 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act, which pro-
vides the framework for establishing the basic conditions under which
documents may not be produced, confers substantial authority to the
Secretary of State.7 9 The broadest allowance for discretion is found in
subsection 2(2) of the Act which prohibits the production of documents:
(a) if [production] infringes the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom or is otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the
United Kingdom; or
(b) if compliance with the requirement would be prejudicial
John Nott noting that 1964 Act was too limited in light of uranium cartel cases).
76 Id. at 1538-39.
17 Id. at 1533 (address of Mr. John Nott). See also Debate: Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of U.S. Antitrust Law, supra note 46, at 620 (L. Kilgerran noting that intent
of Protection of Trading Interests Act is to improve the defenses of the United King-
dom against "attempts by other countries to enforce their economic and commercial
policies outside their own territories"); See also 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1501,
1517 (1980) (L. MacKay noting that intent of the Act was to protect the interests of
the United Kingdom). Novicoff, supra note 38, at 33 (author noting that a strong
motivation for the Act was a "British conviction that the nation's public policy was
being steadily undercut by judicial activity in the United States"). It is worth noting
that the protection of British interests created under the Protection of Trading Interests
Act extends to not only protect against the specific extraterritorial actions of a foreign
state, but also to deter acts by persons within the United Kingdom who should decide to
abide by those foreign interests by violating the Act. Under section 3 of the Act, crimi-
nal sanctions are imposed on persons who violate an order not to produce documents.
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 3(1).
78 The Act "also emphasises [sic] that, in so far as the application or enforcement
of any foreign law requires the active assistance or passive acquiescence of the United
Kingdom the overseas country in question must have regard to the trading interests of
the United Kingdom." 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1533-34 (1979) (re-
marks of Mr. Nott); see also 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 586 (1980) (re-
marks of L. Mishcon).
" Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 2(2).
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to the security of the United Kingdom or to the relations of
the government of the United Kingdom with the government
of any other country.80
The degree of discretion left to the Secretary of State clearly implies
that the Act has no automatic application. There are several factors
which may sway the Secretary of State to bar the production of docu-
ments; examples may be:
[w]hether in the view of the United Kingdom, the subject
matter of the investigation is within the legitimate jurisdic-
tion of the foreign country, whether the United Kingdom's
significant interests are involved and whether a genuine need
for documents is demonstrated, and whether the scope of
compulsory discovery is consistent with practice in the
United Kingdom.8"
This broad grant of discretionary powers to the Secretary of State was
intended to expand the powers conferred under the 1964 Act, 2 and to
promote the Act's ease and breadth of application. 8
In addition to the far-reaching nature of the Protection of Trading
Interests Act, the Act is also retaliatory in application.8 4 While protect-
ing national interests against the expansiveness of the effects doctrine, 5
the Act also represents a strong effort to deter encroachments of foreign
policy into the United Kingdom.' Perhaps the strongest deterrent as-
pects of the Act can be found in its nonrecognition of multiple dam-
ages8 and in its so-called "clawback" provisions.88 Under section 6 of
the Act, any "qualifying defendant" who has been forced to pay dam-
ages in excess of a compensatory remedy
shall be entitled to recover from the party in whose favour
the judgment was given so much of the amount . . . as ex-
ceeds the part attributable to compensation; and that part
shall be taken to be such part of the amount as bears to the
80 Id.
81 Beckett, supra note 38, at 778.
82 973 PARi.. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1547-48 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John
Smith).
83 Rosen, supra note 19, at 227. See also 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533,
1547-48 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John Smith).
84 See Rosen, supra note 19, at 214.
s See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
88 Samie, Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The British Reac-
tion, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 58 (1981-1982).
87 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 5.
88 Id. § 6.
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whole of it the same proportion as the sum assessed by the
court that gave the judgment as compensation for the loss or
damage sustained by the party bears to the whole of the
damages awarded to that party.89
While the clawback of damages in excess of compensation is in line
with the underlying policy of nonrecognition of multiple damages cre-
ated by section 6 of the Act,9" it is novel and unprecedented 9 in its
pointed attack on multiple and punitive damages allowed in United
States lawsuits9 2 and may make the collection of such damages impossi-
ble.93 The broad scope of the clawback provision is made more evident
by the number of defendants who are its potential beneficiaries. Under
the Act, any person who is "carrying on business in the United King-
dom,"94 is potentially qualified to bring an action for recovery of multi-
ple damages. While appearing to be an "extraordinary gift"9 5 to non-
British defendants affected under United States law but carrying on
business within the United Kingdom, the Act does not give "the right to
companies from third countries to enter this country and take action for
recovery under clause six."98 Defendants that conduct any ongoing
businesses within the United Kingdom have the clawback provision as
a potential remedy.
While the clawback provision is broadly drafted, its actual effec-
tiveness may be somewhat limited. During the debates preceding the
passage of the Act, there was a grave concern as to the legitimacy,
under principles of international law, of a "hit-back '97 made through
89 Id. § 6(2).
90 Apparently, section 5 is premised on concepts of international law:
It is a rule of international law that no country's courts will be allowed to
be used by other countries for the benefit of recovering penalties that are
enforced by other countries . . . .There is no earthly reason why our
courts should be used as instruments for the recovery of foreign penalties.
973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1567 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Fletcher Cooke).
9' The novelty of the remedy caused dissension during the debates prior to the
passage of the Act. As one member of the House of Commons inquired, "[w]hy is it
that Britain goes much further than anyone else in developing this principle [of
clawback?]" 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1562-63 (1979); 974 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 1024, 1033 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Prescott).
91 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 562 (1980) (L. MacKay noting focus of
Act on punitive aspects of antitrust litigation in the United States, which effectively
allowed for an unjustified enrichment of American interests); Cira, supra note 36, at
249; Rosen, supra note 19, at 214.
9' Rosen, supra note 19, at 214.
"' Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6(I)(c).
91 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 590 (1980) (remarks of L. Mishcon).
11 974 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1024, 1027 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John
Nott).
91 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1549 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Smith).
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the clawback provision.9" Whether the clawback provision, however, is
ever used in contesting an award of multiple damages in a United
States antitrust case is irrelevant because it appears that Parliament
had intended the clawback provision to constitute either a "warning
shot fired across the American judicial bow" 99 or a symbol of "determi-
nation to do what [could] be done effectively to counter" objectionable
United States policy.1"'
The heart of the conflict giving rise to the Protection of Trading
Act was a fear of an exportation of United States economic policy. As
one author has noted, "[i]f American law could regulate British meet-
ings and agreements with such consequences, it [was] feared, British
law itself would be completely displaced whenever a disquieted con-
sumer or partner chose to take his grievance across the Atlantic."1 1 At
the same time, United States commentators recognize the breadth of the
effects doctrine, but feel that a "deliberate frustration" 2 of the en-
forcement of United States laws or pretrial discovery would be un-
fair.103 Despite the valid interests of the United States, British concerns
are premised on the preservation of national sovereignty and run quite
deep.1
0 4
The national interests supporting the Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act can be contrasted with a nation's concern for the protection of
the rights of its citizens. For instance, many countries that place a
strong emphasis on upholding privacy interests'0 " have enacted bank
11 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 926, 942 (1980) (concern raised by L. Mac-
Kay as to whether such actions taken against a United States act accords with recog-
nized principles of international law).
"' Novicoff, supra note 38, at 34.
o10 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 594 (1980) (remarks of L. Lloyd of
Clashfern). See also 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1550 (1979) (Mr. Smith
effectively arguing that the real power of the clawback provision lies in its symbolic
existence); Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 315 (noting that the clawback provision
"demonstrates the extent to which U.S. antitrust jurisdiction over foreign entities and
foreign conduct has come to be viewed abroad as an overreaching interference with
policies and laws of sovereign nations").
'01 Novicoff, supra note 38, at 30.
102 Id. at 31.
103 Id.
1 See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
105 For instance, in Switzerland, one's right to privacy is considered as an "inte-
gral part of his or her personality rights." Hurd, supra note 64, at 27; Meyer, Swiss
Banking Secrecy And Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 18, 20-21 (1978). See also Note, The Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy on the Enforce-
ment of Insider Trading Regulations & the Memorandum of Understanding Between
the United States and Switzerland, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 541, 544 n.32
(1984) (noting that personality rights protected in civil law jurisdictions typically en-
compass "physical and intellectual integrity, including the protection of health, family
life, and financial affairs").
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secrecy laws.1 0 While United States courts have held that such secrecy
laws represent serious impediments to the enforcement actions of the
SEC, 107 the interests which these laws seek to protect may be accommo-
108 An individual's right to privacy in his own banking affairs is considered to be
immediately derivative from the right of individual privacy and is given substantial
protection. Note, supra note 105, at 544. In a country such as Switzerland, the duties
placed upon a banker owe their existence to the privacy rights of the account holder;
the Swiss banker is obligated by the agency duty owed by him to maintain the confi-
dentiality of the customer. Hurd, supra note 64, at 29; Note, supra note 105, at 546.
While some commentators have argued that the Swiss rights of bank secrecy are di-
rectly analogous to their counterparts in countries such as the United States (see, e.g.,
Newcomb, supra note 60, at 566 ("one finds that [such statutes] provide similar, lim-
ited protections against investigation with more than ample means for domestic policy
authority to conduct investigations deemed appropriate")) it would appear that bank
secrecy rights in the United States are, by comparison, superficial (see Hurd, supra
note 64, at 32 (author noting that the banking relationship recognized in the United
States resembles "little more than that of an ordinary debtor to a creditor")) and lack
"any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank
records." United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
Swiss law specifically enumerates exceptions to the secrecy laws where it is under-
stood that public good preempts private interests. Hurd, supra note 64, at 31. The
rationale understood to be operative in such instances is that public law, in civil law
countries, will outweigh private law where the two are in direct conflict. Note, The
Effect of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement on Swiss Banking Secrecy and Insider Trading, 15
L. & POt'Y INT'L Bus. 565, 575 (1983). Therefore, since bank secrecy rights are
founded on private law, they must be put aside where public law is brought into play.
In addition to exceptions to secrecy rights created by public law, other exceptions can
be created where there is an effective "waiver" of one's rights through involvement in
certain types of transactions. Moessle, supra note 15, at 21-22. While some commenta-
tors have noted that waivers to Swiss secrecy rights when combined with other limita-
tions makes such rights more illusory than real (Newcomb, supra note 60, at 566-69),
the recognized scope of such waivers typically only extends to those acts which, by their
very nature, reveal a protected fact (e.g., a client's identity) to such an extent as to
imply that a waiver has been made. Moessle, supra note 15, at 21-22. Such a waiver
will rarely, if ever, arise in the context of an investor's securities transaction. Id.
"07 The court in SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), was faced with an action brought by the SEC against a Swiss corporation and
several unnamed parties for violation of insider trading provisions. In holding that the
defendants in that case could be compelled to disclose information to satisfy the SEC's
discovery requests despite the possibility of criminal liability in Switzerland, the court
noted that the strength of United States interests clearly outweighed the Swiss interests
involved. Id. at 117 (the court noting "[t]he strength of the United States interest in
enforcing its securities laws to ensure the integrity of its financial markets cannot seri-
ously be doubted. That interest is being continually thwarted by the use of foreign bank
accounts."). Emphasizing the clear preference for United States interests over that of
the Swiss, the court noted in conclusion that "[it would be a travesty of justice to
permit a foreign company to invade U.S. markets, violate American laws if they were
indeed violated, withdraw profits and resist accountability for itself and its principals
for the illegality by claiming their anonymity under foreign law." Id. at 119. In this
same theme, one SEC official has noted that, given the deep-rooted American interests
in obtaining information, there is a feeling among investigative authorities that Swiss
secrecy laws serve only as "an infringement of their ability to enforce federal securities
legislation." Interview with Edward Greene, former General Counsel, Securities and
Exchange Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 1982), cited in Note, supra
note 105, at 570.
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dated by agreements such as the Memorandum of Understanding of
August 31, 1982.108 Through the procedural safeguards provided for in
the Memorandum, both the SEC interests in policing insider trading
were satisfied,"" and the Swiss interests in preserving the privacy
rights of persons within its territory were upheld." In the area of
blocking legislation, however, the interests at stake are of a wholly dif-
ferent character: rather than reflecting the rights of the individual,"'
blocking legislation represents the sovereign interests of an entire na-
tion. 12 Accordingly, a procedural mechanism such as the Swiss Memo-
randum of Understanding cannot easily serve as an adequate means for
108 Reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Memorandum]. This Memoran-
dum supplemented the Treaty between the United States and Swiss Confederate on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 23, 1977, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No.
8302, which made assistance by the Swiss government mandatory in investigations if
the offense was a crime in both Switzerland and the United States and was within the
"Schedule of Offenses" attached to the Treaty. See generally, Hurd, supra note 64, at
43 (discussing provisions of Treaty). The Memorandum provided that SEC investiga-
tions of insider trading fall within the scope of the Treaty if that investigation was in
relation to "conduct which might be dealt with by the criminal courts." Memorandum,
at art. II, 1 3(a). The Memorandum goes further to note that insider trading could be
an offense under the Swiss Penal Code. Id. at art. II, T 3(b). Accordingly, the basic
effect of the Memorandum was to clarify the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance
so as to make it effective in providing the SEC with assistance in its investigations of
insider trading. For a brief description of the problems faced by the SEC in such inves-
tigations prior to the development of the Memorandum, as well as a general description
of the effect of the Memorandum in ensuring Swiss cooperation, see Note, supra note
105, at 565-66, 585-86.
10' Most significantly for the SEC, cooperation by the Swiss is ensured in many of
its investigations of insider trading. While the terms of the Memorandum appear to
limit the scope of assistance by the Swiss to those areas where a criminal investigation
is being made, see supra note 108 and accompanying text, it is generally understood
that the remote possibility that the Department of Justice will punish those inside trad-
ers is sufficient to invoke the language of the Memorandum in providing assistance in
the civil actions brought by the SEC. Note, supra note 105, at 563. Under the broad
language of the Memorandum, as long as the activities for which information is being
requested might be brought in criminal court, the SEC is given assistance in its investi-
gations. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
110 Note, supra note 105, at 564-65. Under the provisions of the Memorandum,
the SEC, when making a request to the Swiss Commission of Inquiry, is required to
divulge all relevant information in the investigation and to demonstrate that there are
"reasonable grounds" for proceeding with the request. Memorandum, supra note 108,
at arts. III, 1 (2)-(4). This request is then granted either automatically or if found to
be reasonable, depending on such factors as whether trading volume has increased by a
sufficient amount over a specific span of time and whether the Swiss Commission of
Inquiry determines that insider trading may have actually occurred. Id. By constructing
adequate procedural safeguards to SEC investigations of insider trading, the Memoran-
dum effectively ensures that the private bank secrecy rights are not lost in the flood of
discovery requests made from the United States. At the same time, the Memorandum
also provides the SEC of some assurance that its investigations of insider trading are
not frustrated by irreconcilable assertions of bank privacy.
... See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
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lessening the tensions created by blocking statutes.
While the Protection of Trading Interests Act may try to protect
legitimate interests, it runs the danger of asserting national interests
beyond the intended scope of countering United States antitrust investi-
gations. The Act has the effect of deterring any legal actions supported
by the United States government.'1 Therefore, while there have been
situations where the Act was used to preserve interests that were in-
tended to be protected," 4 the Act is potentially overbroad. For instance,
where the SEC is investigating an insider trading violation by investors
within the United Kingdom, there is little to prevent Great Britain
from invoking the Act and refusing to cooperate in any investiga-
tions. 115 The possible frustration of United States interests in preserv-
ing the integrity of its securities markets through enforcement actions in
the United Kingdom is thus conditioned upon the unfettered discretion
of the British Secretary of State."' Therefore, the Act poses the danger
of frustrating enforcement of United States securities law abroad.
3. RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL INTERESTS
Few would doubt that the United States has a legitimate interest
in the protection of its securities markets from fraudulent activities at
home and abroad. In achieving this end, the SEC will have to enforce
aggressively its regulations in both the foreign and domestic settings."1
13 Debate: Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, supra note 46, at
627 (remarks of Professor Rahl).
11" One such use of the Protection of Trading Interests Act was made by statutory
instrument in response to the actions of the American court in Laker Airways v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1983). 1983 STAT INSTRUMENT 900
(order by Secretary of State pursuant to § 1(1) of the Protection of Trading Interests
Act). For a general discussion, see Novicoff, supra note 38, at 26-32; Atwood, supra
note 53, at 7.
11 If release of any information requested by the SEC can be deemed, within the
discretion of the Secretary of State, to be "prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom" (Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 2(2)(a)), then it may be
barred from being released. Id. For a general discussion of discretion left to Secretary
of State under the Act, see supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
116 Although the discretion of the Secretary of State in applying blocking statutes
has not previously presented a problem to enforcement efforts of the SEC, the potential
for future abuse of that discretion, however, does exist. See infra notes 173-78.
"' This author wholly subscribes to the view posited by Mr. John Fedders:
If aggressive policing is not carried out, the SEC and United States inves-
tors will be accepting a de facto double standard of law enforcement -
one standard for those trading from within the United States and a lesser
standard for those trading from outside. The United States cannot permit
foreign investors to violate its laws with impunity while holding its own
citizens accountable for violations of the same laws.
Fedders, Policing Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities Markets: The
"Waiver by Conduct" Concept - A Possible Alternative of a Starting Point for Dis-
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Regrettably, due to such obstacles as blocking statutes and secrecy laws,
the regulatory activities of the SEC are frustrated."" In response to
both the possible abuse of United States securities laws by foreign par-
ties abroad and the rapid internationalization of the world securities
markets, there is a growing sentiment that the SEC must devise alter-
native means of regulating international activities" 9 beyond those pres-
ently in effect.' 20
3.1. Unilateral Efforts
In upholding the interests of the United States in protecting its
securities markets, a possible solution would be for the SEC to unilat-
erally extend its regulations to cover all securities transactions in
United States markets. Under the "waiver by conduct" doctrine, 2 '
foreigners would automatically waive the protection of se-
crecy laws as a precondition for engaging in securities trans-
actions in the United States. Such waiver would be implied
by the fact that the transaction took place in our markets.
Thus, the United States could require that foreign investors
make an explicit choice - either forego the investment op-
portunities available here or give up the protection of foreign
laws that might be used to conceal the identity of the investor
and the circumstances of the transaction.
122
Viewed narrowly, the waiver by conduct doctrine constitutes merely an
assertion of jurisdiction over conduct with substantial effects in the
United States.'23 From this same perspective, supporters of the doctrine
cussions?, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 477, 487-88 (1985).
118 Id. at 480 n.10. See also id. at 506 n.54 (noting that where a foreign person
commits a fraud on the United States securities markets, "a country which protects
such a person and blocks United States jurisdiction in effect condones interference with
legitimate United States law enforcement efforts").
119 See, e.g., Note, supra note 106, at 608-09 (noting that the Memorandum of
Understanding between Switzerland and the United States is a definite step towards
effective regulation in, light of the internationalization of the securities markets). See
also Fedders, supra note 117, at 478 (describing need for SEC to devise new
strategies).
120 The present system of international regulations has led one author to note that
"[tihe present system of treaties and other discovery mechanisms is woefully inadequate
as a tool for policing trans-border fraud." Fedders, supra note 117, at 478.
121 Exchange Act Release No. 21,186; 49 Fed. Reg. 31,300, reprinted in 16 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) (Aug. 3, 1984).
.2 Fedders, supra note 117, at 500.
123 Advocates of the waiver by conduct doctrine argue that the proposal recognizes
that "an essential attribute of sovereignty is the effective exercise of jurisdiction over
conduct that occurs within a nation's territory." Id. As a jurisdictional argument, how-
ever, many advocates of the doctrine refer to settled United States law. See, e.g., id. at
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note that it is not an attempt to export United States economic policy
abroad,12 but rather a form of protective legislation 12 5 without unfair
effects on other nations' sovereignty interests. 2 ' While simple and cost-
effective, 17 the doctrine is inconsistent with the need for a cooperative
approach to securities regulation since it takes an immovable stance in
claiming jurisdiction. Where national interests collide as clearly as in
the case of the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the face of
blocking legislation, it makes little sense to suggest that the adoption of
the waiver by conduct doctrine is in any way a "starting point"' 28 for
the resolution of those conflicts. 29 Furthermore, while United States
securities law has not been subject to the foreign reactionary legislation
which United States antitrust law has faced when applied abroad, an
extension of the effects doctrine, as embodied in the waiver by conduct
proposal, may trigger hostile reaction since it gives little deference to
foreign interests. Not surprisingly, the SEC has never given much
credence or serious consideration to the proposal.' Given both the bit-
terly hostile reactions which the extraterritorial use of United States
antitrust laws have received, and the growing perceptions that the
United States is exporting its economic policy to foreign nations with-
out giving proper deference to conflicting foreign interests, it would be
an insult to nondomestic interests to suggest that a broad imposition of
enforcement jurisdiction, such as that embodied in the waiver by con-
duct proposal, represents an attempt to apply principles of comity.'
In application, the waiver by conduct doctrine is counterproductive
in the face of blocking legislation. The waiver only extends the personal
504 n.49 (presenting argument through International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980)); Hurd, supra note 64, at 48 (basing argument in support of waiver by conduct
doctrine on Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).
124 Fedders, supra note 117, at 503 n.48; Hurd, supra note 64, at 48-49.
125 Fedders, supra note 117, at 503 n.48.
126 Fedders also notes the other advantages to the waiver by conduct doctrine are
that it (i) ensures that no person engaged in transactions can avoid scrutiny, (ii) en-
hances those aspects of the United States markets that attract capital investments, (iii)
does not constitute an extraterritorial application of United States securities laws, (iv)
creates a waiver consistent with and recognizable under foreign secrecy laws, (v) ac-
cords with principles of international justice, (vi) is constitutionally sound and (vii)
places no presumption of guilt on the party investigated. Fedders, supra note 117, at
503-06.
127 Id. at 481.
128 See also Hurd, supra note 64, at 47 (making analogous statement that the
waiver by conduct doctrine is necessary since prior efforts at negotiation and balancing
of interests have failed). Contra Fedder, supra note 117, at 480.
129 See supra notes 65-104 and accompanying text.
130 Moessle, supra note 15, at 43.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 64-104. But see Fedders, supra note 117,
at 480.
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interests of the investor. Since bank secrecy laws provide privacy rights
to the individual,"3 2 the waiver by conduct doctrine is clearly applicable
in that context.' 3 In confronting blocking statutes, however, the doc-
trine only creates international discord. 3 Unlike secrecy laws, the in-
terests upheld by blocking statutes are entirely those of the state.'3 It
would be difficult to conceive how a person could "waive" the interests
of the state; therefore, claiming jurisdiction against a person in a block-
ing statute jurisdiction through the waiver by conduct doctrine would
be useless.
The most obvious downfall of the waiver by conduct doctrine is its
inability to weigh foreign and domestic interests before granting juris-
diction to the United States courts.'36 Unilaterally claiming jurisdic-
tion 3 7 is not as justifiable as obtaining jurisdiction after accounting for
both foreign and United States interests. 3 " The waiver by conduct doc-
trine fails to take such a balanced approach. Unilateral assertions of
jurisdiction in contexts unrelated to securities law (principally antitrust
enforcement) originally led to the formation of blocking statutes.'39
Therefore, should history provide any lesson, unilateral attempts to en-
force United States securities laws abroad may be not only ineffective,
but also counterproductive due to their potential to create reactionary
legislation such as blocking statutes. 40 Furthermore, assertions made
by such unilateral efforts offend principles of international comity:"4
[U]nder general principles of comity, recognition and en-
forcement of judicial decrees rendered by the courts of an-
other sovereign nation are premised on observance by the
132 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
133 Note, The Reaction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Inter-
nationalization of the Securities Markets: Three Concept Releases, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J.
ill, 113 (1986).
134 Moessle, supra note 15, at 46-47 ("legal war").
s See supra notes 64-104 and accompanying text; Moessle, supra note 15, at 22;
Note, supra note 133, at 22.
13 It should be noted that the waiver by conduct doctrine has been attacked on a
variety of fronts in addition to those relevant here. See, e.g., Liftin, supra note 28, at
555-56 (noting that the waiver by conduct doctrine is a weak imposition of jurisdiction
due to its lack of due notice of its effect to foreign investors); Moessle, supra note 15, at
44-45 (noting that waiver by conduct doctrine would effectively create a set of double
standards for foreign banks with clients investing in the United States); Widmer, supra
note 26, at 42 (noting that, due to unilateral efforts by the United States, foreign banks
would probably have to give up their securities business with the United States).
"I Moessle, supra note 15, at 42-43.
138 Id.
13I See supra notes 64-104 and accompanying text.
140 See also, Moessle, supra note 15, at 46-47 (for a similar argument in a some-
what different context).
141 Liftin, supra note 28, at 528.
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rendering forum of the essentials of judicial jurisdiction and
of a fair hearing. In addition to reservations based on proce-
dural considerations, courts of foreign nations may decline to
enforce a United States judicial order if the United States
law on which the order is based offends the public policy of
the forum nation.1
42
If one goal in these times of rapid internationalization of the world
securities markets is to facilitate the free flow of capital between mar-
kets, 14 3 a unilateral approach to enforcing one nation's securities laws
will have the effect of impeding that result.144 Unilateral approaches
are inappropriate in addressing the problems of international securities
fraud. Considerations of both domestic and foreign interests must be
made.
3.2. Balance of Interests
3.2.1. Towards a Balancing Approach
A viable alternative to the unilateral actions taken by the United
States in preserving its securities markets would have to involve a bal-
ancing of both the domestic and foreign national interests at issue.
Many authors have both advocated a need for such an approach145 and
attacked the reluctance of administrative bodies or national govern-
ments to balance interests. 46 Several different balancing tests have been
proposed. One example is provided by the Restatement (Revised) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States,' 47 which outlines several
relevant considerations:
In issuing an order directing production of information lo-
cated abroad, a court in the United States should take into
account the importance to the investigation or litigation of
the documents or other information requested; the degree of
specificity of the request; whether the information originated
in the United States; the extent to which compliance with the
request would undermine important interests of the state
142 Id. (emphasis added).
143 Widmer, supra note 26, at 40-42.
I44 Id. See also Williams & Spencer, supra note 31, at 59 (noting that assertions
of extraterritorial jurisdiction can create "counterproductive confrontations between
regulators"); Thomas, supra note 20, at 190 (author noting that "adverse reaction" to
foreign regulators may "impede free flow of capital").
148 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 20, at 189; Widmer, supra note 26, at 43.
148 See, e.g., Novicoff, supra note 38, at 13-14.
147 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
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where the information is located; and the possibility of alter-
native means of securing the information.148
The drafters of these provisions clearly intended to prevent the courts
from broadly expanding the effects doctrine 149 by forcing them to con-
sider carefully an enumerated set of factors which bring foreign inter-
ests into focus.' °
A more elaborate balancing approach was adopted in Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.151 In this antitrust action against sev-
eral Honduran entities for allegedly attempting to maintain control of
the Honduran lumber export business, the court developed a three
prong test in deciding whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be
exercised.' 52 The first prong of the test resembled the traditional effects
doctrine - was there an effect or an intent to cause an effect to the
foreign commerce of the United States.' 5 ' Under the second prong, a
determination was made as to whether the harm done was of such a
scope and nature as to justify use of the antitrust laws.' 54 Under the
last prong, the inquiry was, "[a]s a matter of international comity and
fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be
asserted to cover [the activity]?"' S In adding substance to this last
prong, the court noted:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict
with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of
the parties and the locations or principal places of business
of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative sig-
nificance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose
to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of
such effect, and the relative importance to the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared
with conduct abroad.'
5 6
This standard, like that of the Restatement, gives substantial deference
to interests of international comity by requiring a careful balancing of
148 Id. § 437(1)(c).
149 See Hermann, supra note 19, at 225-28.
150 Hurd, supra note 64, at 34.
'5 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
152 Id. at 615.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 614.
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national interests. 1 7 A substantial degree of discretion, however, is nec-
essarily vested in the court. Some degree of comity must be exercised by
each state's executive in order to ensure the reciprocal effectiveness of
each nation's "regulatory expectations," ' but injecting comity as a
consideration to be weighed by the courts does not ensure that those
interests will be sufficiently considered when domestic policy is per-
ceived to be strong.159 This may be a result of the flexibility underlying
the notion of comity.
1 60
3.2.2. Interests in the Balance
The unilateral exportation of United States economic policy does
not accord with the cooperative spirit of internationalizing the world
securities markets, but neither does an absolute blockage of the infor-
mation necessary to the SEC. Given their effect on regulatory proceed-
ings in this country, blocking statutes, although created in reaction to
extraterritorial actions, have an extraterritorial reach of their own16
and represent a serious impediment to the regulation of the interna-
tional securities markets.1 "2
157 See Hurd, supra note 64, at 35; Liftin, supra note 28, at 553.
158 Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
1"' As one judge has stated,
No nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests
which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum. Thus,
from the earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligations of
comity expire when the strong public policies of.the forum are vitiated by
the foreign act.
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 937; see also Liftin, supra note 28, at 553 (for a similar point
in a different context).
160
"[Clomity" summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive concept -
the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a
foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum. Since comity var-
ies according to the factual circumstances surrounding each claim for its
recognition, the absolute boundaries of the duties it imposes are inher-
ently uncertain. However, the central precept of comity teaches that,
when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect in
domestic courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation and en-
courages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability
through satisfaction of mutual expectations. The interests of both forums
are advanced - the foreign court because its laws have been vindicated;
the domestic country because international cooperation and ties have been
encouraged, which benefits all nations.
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937 (emphasis added).
161 See Simon & Weller, supra note 37, at 2-3 (1985).
162 Inasmuch as it is absurd to argue that unilateral efforts to enforce securities
overseas represents a "starting point" for international negotiation among market regu-
lators, see supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text, so too is it difficult to maintain
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Blocking statutes are premised on an interest in protecting the sov-
ereignty interests and public policy of the state; however, since virtually
any international action may intrude upon a nation's sovereignty inter-
ests, something more than a mere request for assistance in a discovery
proceeding is expected before a broad assertion of national sovereignty
can be made through the use of sweeping blocking legislation.163 One
problem with raising claims of sovereignty interests is their inherent
indefiniteness. Sovereignty interests are, after all, completely within the
eye of the beholder.'" Where foreign actions clearly go beyond the
scope which is necessary to protect the interests which they were in-
tended to support, a balance of national interests may tip in favor of
some limited form of discovery by United States courts."l 5
In principle, sovereignty interests are as vague as comity concerns.
Sovereignty, like jurisdiction,'66 represents a notion of territorial integ-
rity. 6 7 The actions of one state are bound to the territory of that state,
unless a permissive rule exists allowing actions in other states. 6 s In
reality, such permissive rules must exist in order to avoid isolation-
ism.'69 Therefore, claims to international sovereignty should be limited
to those situations where actual macroeconomic harm may be done to
the nation. Otherwise, any dispute between parties of differing nations
can escalate into a conflict of national interests, thereby evading the
actual underlying issues.170 Several commentators have noted that in a
that unilateral action in the form of blocking statutes is, in any way, conducive to
eventual negotiations. Contra 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1577 (1979) (Mr.
Thomas noting that "[i]t is important the [Protection of Trading Interests] bill should
be regarded by our trading partners not as an exercise of economic nationalism but as a
measure that fosters international trade); 974 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1024, 1044
(1979) (Mr. Lawrence noting that intent of Protection of Trading Interests Bill is to
"liberate" international trade); 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1515, 1518 (L. Mac-
Kay noting that Protection of Trading Interests Bill will help to contribute to interna-
tional understandings and negotiations with the United States); 405 PARL. DEB., H.L.
(5th ser.) 1515, 1519-20 (remarks of L. Hacking noting that, in light of the United
States interest in enforcing its economic policy abroad, the Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Bill is a spur to further negotiations).
163 See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 53, at 15 (noting a similar conclusion reached by
several nations in bilateral agreements with the United States).
184 Debate, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, supra note 46, at
628.
165 Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 326.
16 Moessle, supra note 15, at 20.
167 Simon & Weller, supra note 37, at 6.
168 Moessle, supra note 15, at 20.
169 Note, supra note 106, at 606.
170 Simon & Weller, supra note 37, at 11. One example of such an abuse of both
sovereignty interests and public policy has been noted with respect to the divorce laws
of the United Kingdom. Under the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act,
1971, ch. 53, a British court can arbitrarily decide to refuse to recognize a foreign
divorce decree if it is deemed to be against "public policy." Id. § 8(2)(b). See also
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variety of contexts, claims of public policy and sovereignty interests
have been abused by other nations,' 71 and such assertions of national
sovereignty now constitute little more than self-serving declarations to
preserve the interests of a country's nationals.' 72 Therefore, in giving
credence to claims of sovereignty, considerations of actual harm in
terms of such factors as overall "macroeconomic effect,"'7 3 and relative
degree of closeness of the two nations to the underlying controversy
174
must be carefully appraised.
7 5
Apart from the potential for abuse in laying broad claims to sover-
eignty interests, other considerations also weigh in favor of assisting the
SEC in its regulatory affairs. United States securities law is unlike
other regulatory areas such as antitrust because it does not represent "a
misguided sense of United States economic imperialism.' 7  While
some commentators have argued against the broad extraterritoriality of
United States securities laws,. 7 the SEC's efforts may represent both a
"genuine concern for the regulation and integrity of a finite and specific
marketplace"' 8 and a promotion of friendly internationalization of the
world securities markets.' 7 9 Since blocking legislation is in large mea-
Novicoff, supra note 38, at 16-23 (persuasively argues that this public policy limitation
evades cooperation in international law and "allows the United Kingdom to abandon
its facilitative practices at will and resort to the sort of international intransigence ob-
served in litigation of a more public and commercial nature").
' The United Kingdom is included in these nations. See infra note 174 and
accompanying text.
172 See, e.g., Novicoff, supra note 38, at 15 (arguing that "the concept of public
policy, as used in the United Kingdom, has itself lost much of its own internal integrity
and is now being used merely to further private British economic interests at the ex-
pense of international comity"); Simon & Weller, supra note 37, at 8 (stating "[any
recognized notion of pure economic sovereignty unrelated to territorial considerations
should be a narrow concept that is used with precision").
173 Simon & Weller, supra note 37, at 8-11.
174 Novicoff, supra note 38, at 35-36 (advocating that, for the United Kingdom to
impose a blocking order, it should demonstrate that the British court has a "closer
relationship to the underlying controversy" in terms of the implications felt on the
United Kingdom's own affairs).
175 One significantly valuable approach advocated by two authors involves a care-
fully drawn three-part analysis to claims of sovereignty. Simon & Weller, supra note
37, at 8-11. Under the first prong, one looks to determine whether there is a "preexist-
ing fundamental state policy" justifying the claim. Id. at 8-9. Under the second prong,
one looks to the type of party in dispute and the nature and degree of control which is
exercised over the activity of that party by the state. Id. at 9-10. Under the third and
most significant prong, one looks to determine whether there is a "demonstrable likeli-
hood of inequitable injury to the integrity of the state" in the form of a "significant
macroeconomic effect that threatens the state itself." Id. at 10-11.
178 Fedders, supra note 117, at 504 n.50.
177 Thomas, supra note 20, at 193; Note, supra note 106, at 606-07.
178 Fedders, supra note 117, at 504 n.50.
179 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 20, at 194-95 (noting means by which the SEC
accommodates foreign interests and investors through a principle of "voluntarism").
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sure a reaction to the enforcement and not the substance of foreign
law,180 the relatively limited nature of the SEC's discovery requests,' 8 '
as well as the limited injunctive relief typically sought by the SEC
against foreign acts which pose potential harm to the United States
markets,'82 combine to weigh heavily in favor of United States interests.
In addition, arguments have been made that blocking statutes are in-
tended as protection against extraterritorial use of antitrust law and are
thereby inappropriate when used against the SEC; 83 any use of block-
ing legislation is entirely improper for a nation hoping to participate in
a worldwide securities market.'
Another significant fact that weighs heavily for the SEC is that,
unlike the antitrust laws, the antifraud provisions of the United States
securities laws have analogous provisions in the United Kingdom. The
basic prohibitions against insider trading recognized in Great Britain
are provided by the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985:185
an individual who is, or at any time in the preceding six
months has been, knowingly connected with a company shall
not deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of that
company if he has information which -
(a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the
company,
(b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so con-
nected, and in the position by virtue of which he is so
connected, not to disclose except for the proper per-
formance of the functions attaching to that position,
and
(c) he knows is unpublished price sensitive information
in relation to those securities.' 8
Tiis regulation of securities fraud may not be enforced to the same
degree as that in the United States due to the "inadequacy of the meth-
ods of enforcement and the scope for clandestine dealing behind the
180 Newcomb, supra note 60, at 569-70.
181 Fedders, supra note 117, at 506 n.56 (noting, "[t]he SEC does not engage in
fishing expeditions. But were it to abuse its power - whether it did so with respect to
a United States or foreign citizen trading on American markets - it would be re-
strained by United States courts").
182 Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 18-19.
183 Fedders, supra note 117, at 484 n.18.
184 Id. at 496.
185 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8.
186 Id. § 1(1).
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front of a foreign bank nominee";187 however, the legislation does none-
theless recognize the importance of limiting fraudulent activity."' 8 The
only substantial difference between the two policies is that the United
Kingdom's legislation readily imposes criminal sanctions,""9 whereas
the United States' securities laws do not.'90
Counterbalancing the factors weighing in favor of the SEC's ef-
forts abroad, several considerations remain which suggest that it is un-
wise to attempt to export United States securities laws too strongly.
One reaction made to United States securities law resembles that made
to United States antitrust laws:. 9 courts have convoluted United States
securities law to the point of incomprehensibility. 9
For most non-U.S. persons, in particular for Europeans, the
U.S. securities laws constitute an incomprehensible bulk of
infinitely complicated rules which are totally strange to
them. Many look at them as one of the bases for that great
U.S. pastime of suing one another. 9
A further complication involves the type of the civil remedies allowed
under United States securities laws. Under the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act,' 94 the SEC is allowed to bring civil actions for treble
damages:
The legislation gives the Commission authority to seek from
a court a civil penalty of up to three times the amount of
profit gained or loss avoided by a person who violates the
federal securities laws by purchasing or selling a security
while in possession of material nonpublic information. The
new civil penalty may also be sought by the Commission
from a person who aids and abets a violation, within limita-
tions discussed below. The Committee believes the new pen-
alty provided by the legislation will serve as a powerful de-
117 Lee, Law and Practice with Respect to Insider Trading and Trading on
Market Information in the United Kingdom, 4 J. CoMsP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 389,
390 (1982).
188 As one author has noted, "it is the deterrent effect that advocates of the legisla-
tion see as the main purpose of the law." Id.
'89 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8, § 8.
190 This distinction is also drawn by other authors. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 187,
at 390 ("In the United States, civil remedies have dealt with the problem for many
years, and the criminal provisions have rarely been invoked.").
181 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
192 Widmer, supra note 26, at 39.
193 Id.
194 Securities and Exchange Act, § 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1984).
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terrent to insider trading abuses.19
While this powerful legislation provides a substantial deterrent to in-
sider trading,'96 the United Kingdom has already vehemently reacted to
the use of' similar treble damages in the antitrust context. 9 If the
United States wants to avoid the same bitter international reaction that
its antitrust law suffered prior to the passage of the Protection of Trad-
ing Interests Act, it must avoid the same pitfalls. Therefore, the United
States, while enforcing its securities laws abroad, should proceed with
carefully enumerated policies and nonoffensive remedies.
3.2.3. Balancing by the Courts and Government
Assuming that a balancing approach must be adopted, the next
obvious question is to whom that task should be left. The balancing of
interests is usually left to the courts. Occasionally, the courts, in cases
such as Timberlane Lumber,98 strike an accord under principles of
comity,' 99 which adequately balances competing interests. In other
cases, the result is less than satisfactory for foreign concerns. A recent
example of this latter situation is provided by the court in Laker Air-
ways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines.2"' Plaintiff, a transatlantic
airline carrier, brought an antitrust action against several defendants
who had allegedly engaged in monopolistic behavior to drive the plain-
tiff out of business.2°0 After noting the place of comity in balancing
national interests,20 2 the court stated that a limitation is placed on com-
ity considerations where "the foreign act is inherently inconsistent with
the policies underlying comity."203 The court criticized the British gov-
ernment's use of the Protection of Trading Interests Act2"4 and noted
195 H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2274, 2281.
199 Moessle, supra note 15, at 5-6.
19 See supra notes 40-47, 61-63 and accompanying text.
198 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976);
see supra notes 33-78 and accompanying text. In a later case, Mannington Mills Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), plaintiffs alleged that defendant's
licensing practices in foreign countries for the manufacturing of vinyl floor tiles violated
the Sherman Act. In passing on the issue of whether the defendant's act, if as alleged,
were held accountable under the Sherman Act, the court, after tracing through the
history of the Alcoa effects doctrine, adopted a balancing of interests test very similar to
the test adopted in Timberlane Lumber. Congoleum Corp., 598 F.2d at 1291-98.
Il See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
200 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
2o Id. at 916-17.
202 Id. at 937-39. See generally supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
203 Laker Airways, at 939-41.
204 Id. at 940-41. The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, authorizes a
"losing British defendant in a U.S. antitrust action to sue a prevailing U.S. plaintiff in
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that in this situation, a balancing of interests clearly favored the plain-
tiff's cause. The Laker Airways decision has been often criticized, due
to its apparent bias toward American interests.20 5 The value of the
Laker Airways decision, however, derives not from its eventual holding,
but from lengthy dicta placed in a footnote:
Of course, the British government does not intend to invoke
the Protection of Trading Interest Act to bar all jurisdiction
exercised by United States courts over foreign airlines - just
that necessary to provide a forum for the enforcement of
American antitrust laws. This illustrates that the conflict
here is between deeply felt and long held economic and polit-
ical policies of both the United States and the British govern-
ments, and that the courts of the respective jurisdictions are
in no position to resolve that dispute by conceding comity to
the decrees of the other. The comity we are asked to invoke is
thus the comity for the British Executive - and that is
something better left to the American Executive to negotiate.
Conceding comity to the actions of the British courts, which
were brought about and directed rather specifically by the
actions of the British Executive, and whose sole purpose is
the unilateral subjugation of United States interests to those
of Great Britain, would require the American judges to ab-
dicate their oath of office to uphold the laws of the United
States. This we cannot conscientiously do, however much we
understand and respect the position that our English peers
are in.206
Despite arguments that the fault lies in the United States court's failure
to give adequate deference to the interests of foreign countries, 0 7 the
actual fault may lie with the inadequacy of the political branch in ar-
riving at mutual understandings between the executive branches of for-
eign governments which hold competing interests.
A related argument can be made that the judiciary is simply not
the proper body for bearing the responsibility of balancing national in-
Britain for return of two-thirds of any treble-damage award entered by a U.S. court."
Larose, Conflicts, Contracts, and Cooperation: Extraterritorial Application of the
United States Securities Law, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 119 n.99 (1984).
20 Liftin, supra note 28, at 553.
206 Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 941-42 n.121 (emphasis added).
207 See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 64, at 35-37 (criticizing failure of United States
courts to accord adequate deference to foreign interests in nondisclosure from the deci-
sion of Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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terests. Unlike many countries, the United States maintains a relatively
strong and independent judicial system.2"8 The potential exists for a
United States court to abuse its power by transcending the immediate
issues raised in international cases and prematurely considering the re-
spective national interests which are affected.20 9 Experience has shown
that courts will almost invariably favor domestic interests over foreign
ones when balancing national interests.210 Superficially, this empirical
fact may be explained by the inherent nationalism of any state's judici-
ary system.21 ' A more thorough analysis reveals, however, that when
national interests are sufficiently divergent and incongruous, a balanc-
ing of those interests may not work. A perceived bias towards domestic
interests may properly reflect different national outlooks to the same
problem. In the antitrust area, for instance, American and British in-
terests diverge because "cartel and competition are direct oppo-
sites[;]' '21 2 since each nation's view arguably has some degree of valid-
ity, a true balance of interests by courts on either side of that
controversy becomes impossible. Shortly after writing the majority
opinion in the Laker Airways decision, Judge Wilkey stated on a sepa-
rate occasion:
[t]he basis of our decision [in Laker Airways] therefore is
that we as judges do not have the authority to decide that the
longstanding, definite, clear antitrust policy of the political
branches of our government can be compromised because it
comes into conflict with the desires and policy of another
government. That is not for the judges to do. . . .It may be
that it is very unwise for the United States to insist on juris-
diction in this case. But if so, that should be spelled out by
negotiations which judges are not in a position to conduct.
21 3
208 Griffin, Possible Resolutions of International Disputes Over Enforcement of
U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279, 286 (1982).
20I Liftin, supra note 28, at 553-55.
210 See Fedders, supra note 117, at 505-06 n.53 (citing to English case, where
court noted, in weighing foreign interests in nondisclosure, "[wihy should a true for-
eigner, while able to enjoy all the benefits of holding shares in an English company, be
intended to escape the burdens?"); Liftin, supra note 28, at 551 (noting that, in a
balance of national interests, there is "substantial judicial authority" holding that fun-
damental United States interests outweigh competing foreign ones); Moessle, supra
note 15, at 32 (noting "[tihe case analysis has demonstrated that the application of a
mere balancing of interests test provides for litigation certainty only insofar as the
interests of the enforcing state usually prevail").
211 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
212 Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 325.
213 Wilkey, Symposium: Transnational Litigation - Part II: Perspectives from
the U.S. and Abroad: United States of America, 18 INT'L LAW. 779 (1984).
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Some might argue that a balancing approach taken by the judiciary
would solve many of the problems encountered in international securi-
ties regulations. 214 However, an understanding of the difficulties facing
other regulatory areas such as antitrust, as well as an appreciation for
the political undercurrents of any judicial decision, suggest that a bal-
ancing of national interests should not be entirely entrusted to the
judiciary.
The only practical means by which national interests can be bal-
anced in this area is through negotiations between the political
branches of the two countries. While admittedly somewhat slow, costly
and potentially inconsistent in treatment,215 such cooperative ventures
between nations have the advantage that "cooperation increases mutual
understandings of the goals and methods of the various regulatory
schemes. It permits a beneficial exchange of ideas, information and ex-
periences."2 6 Additionally, such an approach has the advantage of eas-
ing international tensions,21 7 thereby fostering a movement towards the
eventual formation of multilateral agreements in policing the world se-
curities markets.218 At the very least, "[flormalization regularize[s] con-
tacts so that people can respond quickly to create the flexible ad hoc
arrangements for special situations [of securities fraud]. 219
4. TOWARDS A MORE ADEQUATE BALANCING OF NATIONAL
INTERESTS
4.1. Approach Under the Present Memorandum of
Understandinge
20
On September 23, 1986, the United States SEC and Commodity
Futures Trading Commission and the United Kingdom's Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) formed an agreement addressing a "cor-
responding need for mutual cooperation between relevant national au-
thorities"'1 2 in light of "increasing international activity in the securi-
214 Thomas, supra note 20, at 194.
215 Fedders, supra note 117, at 488, 498-99.
218 Williams & Spencer, supra note 31, at 60. This recognition of the need for
mutual cooperation has been realized in the antitrust area by both the United King-
dom, 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1534 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John Nott);
404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 555 (1980) (remarks of L. MacKay); 404 PARL.
DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 583 (1980) (remarks of Earl of Inchcape) and the United
States Justice Department (Cira, supra note 36, at 263) for quite some time.
217 Fedders, supra note 117, at 497.
218 Newcomb, supra note 60, at 576-77.
21 Lee, Robert, Hirsch, Pollack, Secrecy Laws and Other Obstacles to Interna-
tional Cooperation, 4 J. CoMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 63, 80 (1982).
220 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 7.
221 Id. at preamble.
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ties, futures and investment markets." '222 Among the regulatory
interests specifically addressed under the Memorandum of Understand-
ing are those rules of either nation "relating to the prevention of insider
dealing in, misrepresentation in the course of dealing in, and market
manipulation in, securities listed on an investment exchange."223
The Memorandum of Understanding is a cooperative effort assur-
ing the SEC that it can obtain much of the information needed for its
regulatory functions if the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding
are satisfied.22 4 The DTI and the SEC agree that they "shall assist the
other by providing to [each other] any information that is either already
in its hands or that it can by its best efforts obtain in order to enable
the other to secure compliance with the relevant legal rules and
requirements. "225
Furthermore, the SEC's ability to gather information under the
terms of the Memorandum of Understanding is clarified. The scope of
the SEC's information gathering abilities extends to investigations
which comply with the domestic rules under which the information is
sought,226 and to any "civil or administrative enforcement proceeding,
assisting in a criminal prosecution, or conducting any investigation re-
lated thereto for any general charge applicable to the violation of the
legal rule or requirement identified in the request. '2 27 The SEC is also
not rigidly limited to the procedures created under the Memorandum of
Understanding, 228 provided that the SEC observes certain minimal
guidelines.229 Finally, the SEC has the assurance that the protections
given under the Memorandum of Understanding will have effect and
will not be revoked without either thirty days notice 23 0 or until such
time as a treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom
relating to insider trading is created.231
While the SEC is given broad rights of enforcing its securities
laws, the Memorandum of Understanding also confers substantial pro-
tection to the national interests of the United Kingdom. A principal
concern of Great Britain embodied by the Protection of Trading Inter-
222 Id.
223 Id. § 1(h)(i)(A).
224 Under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding, both the DTI and
the SEC agree to a "statement of intent," id. § 3, to reciprocally "exchange information
for the purpose of facilitating the performance of their respective duties." Id. § 2.
225 Id. § 4 (emphasis added).
228 Id. § 8(a).
227 Id. § 8(c).
221 See id. § 12.
229 Id.
230 Id. § 18.
23 Id. § 17.
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ests Act was the breadth of the antitrust actions being brought by pri-
vate plaintiffs in the United States.232 A similar concern is addressed in
the Memorandum of Understanding because private plaintiffs are spe-
cifically excluded from obtaining any rights under the Memorandum of
Understanding.23 3 The flexibility of the United Kingdom's sovereignty
interests23 4 is accommodated by conditioning disclosure of information
on public interest.235 A strong objection to the extraterritorial use of the
United States antitrust laws has been that discovery requests made
within the United Kingdom constituted "fishing expeditions"2 beyond
the realm of relevant information.23 7 To accommodate this concern, the
scope of informational requests allowed by the SEC must satisfy three
requirements for disclosure. The first two are the relatively strict stan-
dards of disclosing both the purpose 213 and the legal grounds2 39 for
which the information is sought. There are also strict limitations upon
the purposes for which the SEC can use such information 240 as well as
explicit rules of confidentiality that apply once that information is re-
leased. 24' The third requirement is the imposition of a minimal stan-
dard of "reasonable relevancy" of the information to justify disclos-
ure.2 4 2 Apart from the limitations placed on the SEC in its requests
under the Memorandum, an alternative set of requirements ensures
that the SEC does not engage in broad discovery proceedings through
alternate channels. The Memorandum of Understanding does not force
the SEC to make all of its requests for information through the Secre-
tary of State.143 In following such alternate channels, however, the SEC
must exercise "moderation and restr~int ' ' 244 and follow separate proce-
dures which require, except in cases of urgency,24 5 that the SEC first
make its requests through the Secretary of State.
246
The Memorandum of Understanding accommodates both the in-
terests of the United States and the United Kingdom without any obvi-
232 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
231 Memorandum of Understanding, § 3.
234 For a description of the indefinite quality of sovereignty interests, see supra
notes 159-60, 166-75 and accompanying text.
235 Memorandum of Understanding, § 5.
228 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
237 Id.
238 Memorandum of Understanding, § 7(b)(ii).
239 Id. § 7(b)(iii).
240 Id. § 7(d).
241 Id. § 8.
242 Id. § 9.
243 See supra note 228-29 and accompanying text.
24 Memorandum of Understanding, § 12(a).
245 Id. § 12(b).
246 Id.
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ous favoritism towards either side. The United States' interests are sat-
isfied to the extent that assurances are created to give some degree of
legitimacy to the enforcement of its regulations in the United Kingdom.
At the same time, the United Kingdom's interests in maintaining its
sovereignty are for the moment accommodated. As an "interim" agree-
ment,2 47 the Memorandum of Understanding provides a temporary
compromise to the balance of two otherwise irreconcilable national
interests.
As a temporary framework, the Memorandum of Understanding
fails to create any mechanisms for ensuring that an adequate balance of
those interests is maintained. For United States concerns, the greatest
accomplishment of the Memorandum of Understanding may be its ef-
fect of extending the investigatory powers of the SEC.248 However, the
247 Id. § 17.
241 Under the statutory provisions of the 1934 Act, the SEC has the authority to
issue subpoenas and to compel the production of witnesses in its investigations of poten-
tial violations of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1982). When applied
within the territorial boundaries of the United States, such exercises of power are con-
sidered valid uses of sovereign power, Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de
Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that
"[tiraditionally, a state has plenary power to prescribe rules within its own territorial
boundaries"), and are supported by the enforcement powers of the federal courts. Id. at
1311. However, when applied outside of the United States, the powers of the SEC are
not so clearly defined. See Case Comment, Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz: An Undue
Extension of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the Extraterritorial Application of the
Federal Securities Laws, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 579, 584-85 (1985) (noting that
neither legislative history nor express wording places any guidelines on the extraterrito-
rial use of the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act).
A distinction should be noted between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction to prescribe signifies a state's authority to enact laws gov-
erning the conduct, relations, status or interests of persons or things,
whether by legislation, executive act or order, or administrative rule or
regulation. Jurisdiction to enforce, by contrast, describes a state's authority
to compel compliance or impose sanctions for noncompliance with its ad-
ministrative or'judicial orders.
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1315.
Therefore, although the United States may have the authority to prescribe laws
relating to securities regulations where there is a showing of either an effect on Ameri-
can investors or conduct in the United States, see supra note 19 and accompanying text,
a court order enforcing an agency's investigatory subpoena "represents an attempt by
the U.S. to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction within foreign territory before its pre-
scriptive jurisdiction over the investigated conduct has been proved to exist." Compa-
gnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1317.
Agencies such as the SEC, are severely limited in their ability to issue investiga-
tory subpoenas abroad. Id. at 1309; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Zanganeh,
470 F. Supp. 1307 (D.C. 1978); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Minas de
Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1945). In large measure, this result is due to the
fact that enforcement of a subpoena issued by a United States agency through a federal
court represents an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction without a requisite showing of
prescriptive jurisdiction. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at
1316.
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need for a sensible balance of national interests becomes acute once a
case proceeds towards litigation before a United States court. The
Memorandum of Understanding provides no permanent mechanisms
for guaranteeing that a proper balance is struck. A procedural frame-
work is needed through which the agencies of governments with con-
flicting interests can arrive at such a compromise.
4.2. Establishing a Balancing Procedure: The Australian-United
States Antitrust Approach
Much of the hostility felt in the United Kingdom against the ex-
traterritorial use of United States' laws is generated by the application
of the effects doctrine.2 9 Since it is the use, rather than the theoretical
existence of that doctrine which appears to generate foreign irrita-
tion,250 an acceptable limit to its application should be found before any
resulting international conflicts develop. A well-formulated balance of
national interests may provide such a limit.251 Therefore, to avoid po-
tential conflict which may otherwise be generated by SEC actions
abroad, it is necessary that both sides of any controversy establish a
preliminary balance of interests at the earliest possible moment.252
A means of balancing the United States' interests with those of the
United Kingdom can be derived from the approach taken in the Agree-
ment Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters
(Agreement).25
An alternative means by which American agencies can obtain information from
abroad is through the use of international agreements and treaties. Through such
mechanisms, a nation may specify the appropriate procedural channels for an agency to
proceed thereby ensuring that a minimal infringement of another nation's jurisdiction
occurs. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1313-14 n.69.
249 Larose, supra note 204, at 119 (noting that "[tihe Reporters are undoubtedly
correct in identifying chauvinistic applications of U.S. regulations based solely on the
economic effect of a foreign transaction in the United States as a source of irritation to
foreign sovereigns").
250 Note, The United States - Australian Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: A
Step in the Right Direction, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 127, 168 (1983).
251 See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
212 This same need for an early balance of interests has also been perceived in the
antitrust context. Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 342 (1982) (noting that "every effort
should be made to accommodate the balancing of interests process at an early stage").
253 Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, Aus-
tralia-United States, T.I.A.S. No. 10365, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 702 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Agreement]. In the area of antitrust law, agreement has been viewed quite
favorably.
The existing antitrust cooperative agreements with Canada and West Ger-
many have functioned well. They and the new Australian government
may be useful models for other bilateral agreements on notification and
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Australia, like the United Kingdom, has had numerous difficulties
with extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction in United States antitrust
cases.254 Objections have been voiced against the broad discovery re-
quests,2 55 treble damages actions,256 and, in particular, the private
party character of United States antitrust litigation.257
The point is that exactly the same principle of jurisdiction
- of extraterritorial jurisdiction - applies in those private
suits. In that event, the same possibilities exist for collision
between the United States national economic policy and
those of foreign governments and there is the same likelihood
of the sovereignty of other countries being affected by extra-
territorial enforcement . . . . Questions of sovereignty or
comity are matters between nations. In no way should the
principle of international comity depend upon private
litigants.25"
Largely in response to perceptions that the United States was exporting
its economic policy, the Australian government passed strong blocking
statutes.259 The stated intent was to "[prevent] the [p]roduction of
consultation. The subject matter of the future agreements should elaborate
on the Australian agreement proviso on extraterritorial discovery and in-
tervention by the Executive Branch in private cases.
Griffin, supra note 208, at 305 (1982).
Although the Australian Agreement was created in the antitrust context, the prin-
ciples of balancing of interests involved in creating such antitrust agreements may be
applied quite easily in the securities regulations area. Murano, Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2 INT'L
TAX & Bus. LAW. 298, 317-19 (1984).
254 For a general discussion of Australian objection to American exportation of
economic policy, see Note, supra note 250, at 127 (1983).
2155 Id. at 146.
256 Id.
257 Id.
25 Press Release of Australian Attorney-General Durack on Oct. 5, 1980, quoted
in Note, supra note 250, at 146.
259 E.g., Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976, No.
121, Austl. Acts (1976), as amended, Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evi-
dence) Amendment Act 1976, No.,202, Austl. Acts (1976).
It is particularly noteworthy both that the Australian blocking legislation was
passed very quickly in response to litigation arising from the case of In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), and that the resulting blocking
legislation vested considerable discretion in the Attorney-General in deciding whether
information was to be released. As amended, the Act provides that:
The Attorney-General shall exercise his powers under this Act so as to
impose restriction only where he is satisfied that . . . a foreign tribunal is
exercising or proposing or likely to exercise jurisdiction or powers of a
kind or in a manner not consistent with international law or comity in
proceedings having a relevance to matters to which the laws or executive
powers of the Commonwealth relate, being the only proceedings of a for-
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[clertain [d]ocuments, and the [giving of [c]ertain [e]vidence, for the
purposes of [p]roceedings in [floreign [c]ourts."26 The Agreement was
intended to allow the United States to enforce its antitrust laws in light
of this blocking legislation.
As a protection to United States interests, the Agreement obligates
the Australian government to cooperate in any antitrust investigations
or enforcement actions, as long as there is no "adverse effect" on Aus-
tralian interests. 28 As long as adequate notice is given, United States
investigations and discovery requests in Australia will not automatically
trigger the use of blocking statutes.
The mere seeking by legal process of information or docu-
ments located in its territory shall not in itself be regarded
by either Party as affecting adversely its significant national
interests, or as constituting a basis for applying measures to
prohibit the transmission of such information or documents
to the authorities of the other Party, provided that in the case
of United States legal process prior notice has been given of
its issuance. Each party shall, to the fullest extent possible
under the circumstances of the particular case, provide notice
to the other before taking action to prevent compliance.2" 2
Other provisions also act to protect Australian interests. For in-
stance, the obligation to notify the Australian government starts before
investigations have commenced.283 When a United States governmental
agency "decides to undertake an antitrust investigation that may have
implications for Australian laws, policies or national interests, the Gov-
ernment of the United States shall notify the Government of Australia
eign tribunal in relation to which the restriction are to have effect.
Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976, No. 121, Austl. Acts,
§ 4(1)(a) (1976), as amended, Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence)
Amendment Act 1976, No. 202, Austl. Acts, § 4(a) (1976).
For a general discussion of the conflict giving rise to the Australian blocking legis-
lation, see Note, supra note 250, at 145.
260 Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976, No. 121,
Austl. Acts (1976), preamble, as amended, Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain
Evidence) Amendment Act 1976, No. 202, Austl. Acts (1976).
261 Under article five,
When a proposed investigation or enforcement action under the antitrust
laws of one nation does not adversely affect the laws, policies or national
interests of the other, each Party shall cooperate with the other in regard
to that investigation or action, including through the provision of informa-
tion and administrative and judicial assistance to the extent permitted by
applicable national law.
Agreement, art. 5, 1 1.
262 Id. at art. 5, T 2.
263 Id. at art. 1, 2.
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of the investigation. '"264
A further procedural mechanism for assuring that an adequate
balance of interests is struck is provided by the obligation of mutual
consultation created under article two.2 5 Whenever either the United
States or the Australian government perceives that actions of one nation
have effects on the other's national interests, an affirmative obligation is
placed on the nation causing the effects to participate in consultations
after notice and a request from the affected nation. 266 These consulta-
tions are required to focus on the effects that a nation's acts have on the
interests of the other nation.267
Of significant importance to the Australian government, 268 article
six of the Agreement adds substance to the consultation and notification
requirements by obligating the United States government to notify its
courts of the relevant national interests balanced during such
consultations.
When it appears to the Government of Australia that private
antitrust proceedings are pending in a United States court
relating to conduct, or conduct pursuant to a policy of the
Government of Australia, that has been the subject of notifi-
cation and consultations under this Agreement, the Govern-
ment of Australia may request the Government of the
United States to participate' in the litigation. The Govern-
ment of the United States shall in the event of such request
report to the court on the substance and outcome of the
consultations.269
264 Id.; see, Griffin, supra note 208, at 290-91 (noting that such obligations to
notify and consult with foreign governments prior to bringing enforcement or investiga-
tory actions is essential to a balance of national interests).
265 Agreement, art. 2.
268 Id. at art. 2, M 1-3.
26" Under the Agreement,
Both parties during consultations shall seek to identify any respect in
which (a) implementation of the Australian policy has or might have im-
plications for the United States in relation to the enforcement of its anti-
trust laws; and (b) the antitrust enforcement action by the Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission of the United States has or
might have implications for Australian laws, policies or national interests.
Id. at art. 2, 1 4.
268 Note, supra note 250, at 159 (noting that foreign governments should welcome
the procedural framework established in article six of the Agreement, since "relevant
foreign interests should now be clear to the court before it decides to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction in private treble damages suits. These reports also will add legiti-
macy to foreign government amid briefs and discourage denigrating language by
United States courts in the future").
269 Agreement, art. 6.
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Since it is essential that courts strike an adequate balance of national
interests once international antitrust litigation has commenced,27 a re-
quirement that the United States government report to the courts as to
the outcome of such balancing consultations goes far to reduce interna-
tional tensions.
271
Under the Agreement, joint negotiating efforts are entirely apart
from the judicial setting. In this way, the Agreement adds legitimacy to
its eventual result by dispelling any claims of latent "imperialism"
thought to inhere in any decision by the United States courts. 2  Fur-
thermore, by allowing the Australian government the right to require
the United States government to "participate in the litigation" 273 and to
"report to the court on the substance and outcome of the consulta-
tions, ' 274 the Agreement ensures that a balance acceptable to Austra-
lian interests is presented to United States courts at any subsequent
stage of litigation.
Since the Agreement appears to present an ideal procedure for ac-
commodating national interests in the antitrust setting, there is reason
to believe that a similar procedural safeguard might be useful in limit-
ing the enforcement of United States securities laws. A procedural
mechanism similar to that embodied in article six of the Agreement
could provide protection of foreign interests in litigation - a safeguard
which the Memorandum of Understanding does not ensure. Given the
divergence of interests represented by blocking statutes from those sup-
porting the United States efforts in regulating securities fraud,2 75 a ne-
gotiated effort outside of the courtroom may be more important in se-
curities law than in the antitrust context. A securities regulation treaty
modeled on article two of the Agreement could provide a listing of ne-
gotiated factors to be balanced by the courts under their own balancing
procedures. The appropriate considerations to be balanced could be
easily provided by the United States government to its courts whenever
balancing became necessary. 276 Therefore, by allowing for provisions
270 Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 342-43.
21 An analogous point raised by several commentators is that the United States
government should impress upon the courts both the foreign and domestic interests at
stake. Id.; Note, supra note 250, at 151-52 (1983).
The need for the United States government to address the balance of interests
before the courts arises from the fact that "an unfortunate lesson of the uranium cases
for foreign governments is that their views may have little impact unless endorsed,
seconded, or presented by the American government." Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at
342.
2172 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
274 Id.
2 See supra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 199-219 and accompanying text.
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such as those contained in article six of the Agreement in any eventual
cooperative effort between the United States and Britain pursuant to
the Memorandum of Understanding, a balance of the interests of both
the SEC and Britain could be maintained at virtually any stage of
litigation.
In addition to creating provisions modeled on article six of the
Agreement, other considerations must be addressed in the negotiation of
an agreement to supersede the Memorandum of Understanding. Limi-
tations should be imposed on the discretion given to the British Secre-
tary of State in the application of blocking legislation. Again, the
Agreement, which both establishes an obligation on the part of Austra-
lia to cooperate in United States agency efforts2 7 and forbids the auto-
matic blocking of information, 7 ' is instructive. If the SEC wishes to
apply United States securities laws in the face of blocking legislation, it
should seek guarantees from foreign nations similar to those outlined in
the Agreement. The United Kingdom should seek protections in addi-
tion to those created under the present Memorandum of Understand-
ing. For instance, a requirement may be imposed that the SEC notify
the DTI prior to its starting any investigations of securities fraud2 9
and enter into consultations similar to those provided under the Agree-
ment.280 More importantly, protection of British interests may require
that the SEC seek information only on the condition that it would not
seek treble damages under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act.2 ' Such a
condition to disclosure may help to prevent the harsh criticism which
treble damages evoke from the United Kingdom when the United
States seeks such damages in the antitrust context.282
5. CONCLUSION
World securities regulators are faced with rapid internationaliza-
tion of the world capital markets. With advances in technology, com-
municative barriers of oceans and continents fade away and transac-
tions between nations become almost instantaneous.283 At the same
time, important national interests, in the form of sovereignty and integ-
rity of national markets, remain and become new barriers to the grow-
277 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
278 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 265-74 and accompanying text.
20 Such a provision may be modeled on the requirements presently in effect
under the Agreement. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
283 Thomas, supra note 20, at 190; Williams & Spencer, supra note 31, at 55.
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ing trend towards the internationalization of these markets. While it is
improper to lightly compromise national interests, a functioning inter-
action between markets may be sacrificed by stubbornly clinging to na-
tional ideals. Insofar as we are willing to believe that "[a] properly
functioning world securities market would permit the more efficient al-
location of the increasingly scarce world resources,"28 such a sacrifice
is one which few of us should be willing to make.
The only efficient remedy for this dilemma is through cooperative
approaches that recognize and give credence to the various interests that
each nation holds. From this perspective, bilateral agreements must be
undertaken to lessen international conflict. This need is even greater
when national interests, such as those represented in blocking statutes,
are buttressed by tensions created by transnational conflicts. Admit-
tedly, a cooperative approach offers no expedient solution to the
problems faced by the SEC in enforcing its regulations abroad. How-
ever, given the difficulties which unilateral measures may create
through bold assertions of enforcement jurisdiction, expedient solutions
are not always best.28 As this Comment has argued, such quick solu-
tions may be disastrous and counterproductive.
284 Williams & Spencer, supra note 31, at 56.
285 Id. at 61.
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